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1. Introduction 
During the last years we saw many theoretical developments in the field of credit risk 
research. Most of this research concentrated on the pricing of corporate and sovereign 
defaultable bonds as the basis of credit risk pricing. These studies can be divided in two 
main categories: structural models and reduced-form models1. 
 
Structural models have its origins in Merton (1974) framework, which has been the 
key foundation of corporate debt pricing. Relying on the contingent claims analysis of 
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) presents a simplified model that can be used to 
value each component of the firm’s liability mix. As noticed by Cossin and Pirrote 
(2001), “It is called the ‘structural approach’ because it relies entirely upon the sharing 
rule for the value of the assets of the firm between two main classes of claimholders, the 
shareholders and the bondholders, in other words, it depends on the actual capital 
structure of the firm”(p.15). In such a framework, the default process of a company is 
driven by the value of the company’s assets and the firm’s default risk is explicitly linked 
to the variability in the firm’s asset value. Under these structural models, all the relevant 
credit risk elements, including default, are a function of the structural characteristics of 
the firm: asset volatility (business risk) and leverage (financial risk).  
 
Reduced-form models, on the other hand, do not condition default on the value of the 
firm, and parameters related to the firm’s value do not need to be estimated. Moreover, 
reduced-form models introduce explicit assumptions regarding the dynamics of default 
variables. These variables are modeled independently from the structural features of the 
firm, its asset volatility and leverage.  
 
Built on the arbitrage-free methodology, the Merton (1974) model allows for the 
valuation of a firm’s debt and equity without a prior knowledge of the real drift of the 
firm’s asset. In some sense Merton (1974) expands the advantage of Black and Scholes 
(1973) framework to the valuation of a firm’s claims.  
 
Despite this innovative nature, Merton (1974) model presents many shortcomings 
that are essentially due to its simplifying assumptions about reality. It assumes that the 
liability structure of the firm consists only of a single class of debt, a non-callable zero 
                                                 
1 Schmid (2004) uses an alternative denomination for these categories. He classifies structural models as 
asset based models and reduced models as intensity based models. 
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coupon bond, and that bankruptcy is not only costless but also cannot be triggered before 
maturity. In addition, it assumes that the absolute priority rule always holds at maturity, 
meaning that equityholders can only obtain a positive payoff after debtholders being 
totally reimbursed. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption. Franks and Torous (1994) 
show that the strict absolute priority rule was violated in 78% of the bankruptcies of their 
sample. Another important stylised version of reality is the assumption of a flat term 
structure of interest rates.  
 
Many papers, including Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994), Leland 
and Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000) and Collin-Dufresne and 
Golstein (2001) have extended the original Merton (1974) model to incorporate more 
realistic assumptions. A new assumption, which is common to all these models, and 
represents a major improvement of the Merton framework, is the possibility of early 
default. In these models the firm can go into bankruptcy before maturity, as soon as a 
bankruptcy trigger for the asset value is reached. Schmid (2004) classifies the models 
with this feature as First Passage Time Models. 
 
Black and Cox (1976) is the first model to introduce net worth covenants, which 
provide the bondholders the right to force the firm into bankruptcy as the firm value hits 
some deterministic time-dependent threshold. Having triggered this level, bondholders 
receive the assets of the firm. Black and Cox also discuss the implications of different 
debt classes (senior and junior debt) and endogenize the default boundary. This model 
serves as the basis for many recent extensions of the structural approach. Even with this 
improvement, the pricing in this model continues to be done on zero-coupon bonds with 
zero recovery upon default. Moreover, it does not avoid the problem found in the Merton 
(1974) model of extreme underestimation of credit spread for very short maturities. In 
these two models, as maturity goes to zero, the spreads also go to zero.  
 
One year later, Geske (1977) launches the design of equity as a compound option. He 
assumes that the stockholders of a company (with risky coupon bonds) have, at each 
coupon payment, the option to pay or not pay later coupons. This introduces the idea that 
stockholders have to take into account future debt obligations when deciding on the debt 
service. In this framework, bankruptcy occurs when the value of assets is so low that 
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equityholders no longer find profitable to service debt. Equity and debt valuation requires 
the use of compound option theory. 
 
Despite Black and Cox’s (1976) introduction of early default and Geske’s (1977) idea 
of equity as a compound option, these models could not present a solution to one of the 
main challenges of financial theory: the determination of an optimal debt policy. 
Regarding this question, they found a similar answer as Merton (1974) did: there is no 
optimal capital structure. Actually, this proposition had been introduced in the 1950’s in 
the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Assuming frictionless markets and 
through an arbitrage argument Modigliani and Miller show that the value of the firm is 
not affected by the mix of equity and debt. The value of the firm depends only on the 
investment decisions and there is no role for the capital structure policy.  
 
It was not until Leland’s (1994) work that the optimal capital structure decision was 
operationalised in continuous time.  Prior to Leland (1994), there was just a discrete time 
implementation of the capital structure decision by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). Other 
authors have also discussed why a certain capital structure may be better than another, 
but just in a conceptual basis. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss the consideration of 
taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency problems (under investment, over investment and 
free cash flow) in the capital structure decision. Assuming that leverage causes potential 
conflicts of interest between equityholders, managers and debtholders, they establish 
conceptually an optimal capital structure as the one that minimizes the sum of agency 
costs of equity and agency cost of debt. 
 
Leland (1994) extends Black and Cox (1976) endogenous default model to include 
the tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy costs. The first “real world friction” works an 
incentive to increase the leverage (because of the tax benefit of interest payment) and 
bankruptcy costs as a disincentive. The optimal capital structure decision is therefore a 
tradeoff between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs.  
 
Similarly to Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994) found that the default boundary 
increases with the coupon payment and decreases with the risk free rate and asset 
volatility. The only difference between the default boundaries in these two models is that 
the coupon has to be adjusted for the tax shield in Leland.   
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In deriving his results, Leland (1994) makes several assumptions. One of them, the 
infinite maturity debt, is relaxed two years later in Leland and Toft (1996), allowing the 
study of both the influence of debt amount on the capital structure decision (and credit 
spread), as well as the impact of debt maturity chosen. In this framework, the pricing 
formulas are no longer time independent as they were in Black and Cox (1976) and 
Leland (1994). In Leland and Toft (1996) we found many of the results obtained in 
previous structural models regarding the term structure of credit spread. The hump-
shaped term structure of credit spreads on high levered firms and a monotonously 
increasing credit spread in low levered firms is confirmed. As in the Merton (1974) 
model, they found that credit spreads might not always increase with the maturity of the 
bonds, especially if we consider junk bonds.  
 
Both Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) models assume that default occurs as 
soon as the equity value reaches zero. This is a strict consequence of the assumption that 
raising cash through an equity issue is costless and that the absolute priority rule is 
respected. However, deviations from the absolute priority rule are common. We may 
have the equityholders obtaining a positive value in the event of default even when senior 
claimers are not fully paid off. Moreover, bankruptcy procedures leave some 
considerable scope for strategic behaviours from the different claimants involved. The 
recognition of these “real world features” lead to the appearance of new structural models 
usually denominated strategic debt service models. These include Anderson and 
Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) 
models. 
  
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) model the asset value as a binomial process and 
assume that this asset realizes a certain cash flow over time. Debtholders receive the 
contractual debt service as soon as the generated cash flow is sufficient to cover it. If the 
manager or owner of the firm defaults on the debt contract then debtholders receive the 
asset value less the amount of liquidation costs. The existence of these liquidation costs 
leaves some role for debt renegotiation between both parts. Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1996) assume that managers have all the bargaining power, making it possible for them 
to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to debtholders. With this power, managers will choose a 
debt service that cannot be higher than the cash flow of the firm. In the case that this debt 
service is equal to the contractual debt service, the firm continues to operate normally. 
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Otherwise, debtholders can choose whether they want to force the company into 
bankruptcy or accept a lower coupon.  
 
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) enhance Anderson and Sundaresan’s (1996) model by 
considering first, a continuous time-framework, and secondly, corporate taxes. It 
addition, they introduce a bargaining power parameter, making possible a redistribution 
of power between debtholders and equityholders. In Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) all 
the bargaining power is attributed to managers, who act in the equityholders’s interest.  
 
While the studies of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Fan and Sundaresan 
(2000) assume a geometric Brownian motion process for the asset value of the firm, 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) assume an identical process for the output price of the 
firm’s product. They further assume a fixed cost of operation. If new owners operate the 
firm after bankruptcy, there is a loss of efficiency as they can only operate the output 
with lower prices and higher costs. Alternatively, the firm can be liquidated for a certain 
liquidation value.  
 
Using a time independent framework they found closed-form solution for the pricing 
of debt. In this pricing exercise the liquidation threshold plays an important role. Under a 
lower critical level for the output price, the firm is liquidated and bondholders receive the 
collateral. Above the upper critical level the debtholder receives its regular coupons. The 
debt renegotiation will occur whenever the state variable is between these two critical 
levels. If equityholders have the all bargaining power and thus can make take-it-or-leave-
it offers to bondholders they propose coupon payments below the contractual coupon, 
approximating the debt value to the firm’s liquidation value. The firm is operated by the 
original equityholders in a fully efficient way. On the other hand, if debtholders have all 
the bargaining power they will operate the firm but in a less efficient way than would 
occur without renegotiations. Debtholders will keep the firm alive by injecting capital 
until the liquidation is efficient. 
 
Even though all these strategic debt service models have the advantage of 
incorporating deviations from the absolute priority rule, they rely on some simplifying 
assumptions about debt characteristics. They have the disadvantage of assuming 
perpetual coupon debt, making unfeasible the analysis of the term structure of credit 
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spread. In addition, Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) cannot yield closed-form solutions 
for the pricing of bonds. 
 
One of the main weaknesses of the Merton (1974) study and many other models that 
extended his work is the assumption of a flat term structure. This assumption contradicts 
what has been observed in most economies. In the last decades we have observed a mix 
of downward and upward sloping term structures, with the market prices of corporate 
bonds being sometimes highly sensitive to the slope of the term structure, rather then just 
the level.  Therefore, it seems important to consider interest rate risk when valuing risky 
debt.  
 
Kim at al (1993), Nielsen et al (1993) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) are the 
main contribution is this area. Among these, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model is the 
one that has deserved more attention in recent empirical papers. Recognising the 
shortcoming of the Merton model, that default can occur only at maturity, Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) also allow for early default. They model default as the time when the 
value of the debt reaches some constant threshold, which serves as a distress boundary. 
When the value of the assets reaches this barrier, default is triggered, and some form of 
restructuring occurs such that the remaining asset value is allocated among the firm’s 
claimants.  Hence, contrary to Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) assume that the allocation of the firm’s assets is given exogenously. 
 
Another improvement of Merton (1974) framework, proposed by Zhou (2001), is the 
assumption of a jump diffusion process where the firm can suddenly default because of a 
downward drop in its value. Under the traditional diffusion approach (GBM) this is not 
possible, implying that perfectly healthy firms have a null probability of bankruptcy and 
a corresponding credit spread of zero, while there is evidence of a systematic positive 
credit spread. With a jump-diffusion process it is possible to capture the jump risk in 
credit spread and fit a wide variety of term structures of credit spreads: flat, upward, 
downward sloping or even hump-shaped. 
 
Several empirical studies have pointed out the weaknesses of the Merton (1974) 
model, in particular its incapacity to generate the levels of yields spreads observed in the 
market. These include, among others, the papers of Jones et al (1984), Ogden (1987), 
 9
Wei and Guo (1997), Lyden and Saraniti, (2000), Ericsson and Reneby (2002) and Eom 
et al (2004). 
 
Jones et al (1984) analysed 177 bonds issued by 15 firms and found that Merton 
model overestimates bond prices by an average of 4.5%. They conclude that the model 
performs better for speculative grade bonds and that prediction errors are systematically 
related to maturity, equity variance and leverage. Ogden (1987), on the other hand, 
looked at 57 callable bonds and sinkable corporate bonds and found that Merton model 
underestimates spreads by 104 basis points (bp) on average. Both studies conclude that 
the incorporation of a stochastic interest rate process may yield significant improvements 
in the performance of the model. These studies suffer from some problems with the 
inclusion of callable bonds and sinking fund provisions. By considering bonds with these 
features it is difficult to evaluate whether the underestimation revealed by the Merton 
model is due to its assumptions or to the pricing of these features by investors. 
 
During this decade, the studies of Lyden and Saraniti (2000), Ericsson and Reneby 
(2002) and Eom et al (2004) represent an improvement in terms of the quality of the 
bond sample. All these studies not only use firms with simple capital structures but also 
exclude from the sample bonds with any call or sinking fund provision. Lyden and 
Saraniti (2000), who compare the performance of Merton (1974) model with the 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model, find that both these models underestimate the 
credit spread. For the Merton model the average underestimation in credit spread is 
between 80 and 90 bp and the errors are systematically related to coupon and time to 
maturity. The allowance for early default and stochastic interest rate of the Longstaff and 
Schwartz model does not improve the performance of the model.  
 
Ericsson and Reneby (2002), who implemented a perpetual bond model based in 
Black and Cox (1976) framework, found a good performance of the model. They also 
found that prediction errors are linked to liquidity. There is a greater underestimation of 
credit spread for speculative grade bonds, which are perceived to be less liquid.  
 
To date, the most comprehensive empirical study about the performance of corporate 
debt pricing models is found in Eom et al (2004). They assess the empirical performance 
of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996) 
and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) models using a sample of 182 bond prices 
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during the period 1986-1997. For the Merton (1974) model the underestimation problem 
is confirmed but for other models, like Leland and Toft (1996), there is an overestimation 
of credit spread, which they report as due to the accuracy of the calibration process. The 
prediction power of these models seems to be related to leverage, size, asset volatility 
and some term structure control variables. 
 
There are other empirical papers that calibrate some of the structural models of 
corporate bond pricing but that do not focus on the analysis of its performance. These 
include, among others, Anderson and Sundaresan (2000), Collin-Dufresne et al (2001), 
Huang and Huang (2002), Cooper and Davydenko (2003) and Vassalou and Xing (2004). 
 
The reduced-form approach mentioned in the beginning of this section can also be 
seen as a way to overcome the problems found in structural models. By specifying the 
default process exogenously, it is possible to apply the reduce-form model to situations 
where the underlying asset value is not observable. In addition, since the default time is 
unpredictable, it is possible to capture the behaviour of credit spreads for short maturities 
more realistically.  
 
A long list of papers has appeared recently in this field, but we highly Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1999). The first one presents a model where 
the bankruptcy process is compared to a spot exchange rate process and the default 
process is driven by a Poisson process with a constant intensity parameter and a given 
payoff at default. On the other hand, Duffie and Singleton (1999) demonstrate that 
valuation under the risk-neutral probability measure can be executed by discounting the 
non-defaultable payoff on the debt by a discount rate that is adjusted for the parameters 
of the default process.  
 
Even though the reduced–form models reveal many attractive properties, they cannot 
establish the link between firm value and corporate default, as the structural models do.  
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2. Theoretical Models 
In this section we describe the main theoretical assumptions of the Merton (1974), 
Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) models. Moreover, there is a presentation 
of the formulas concerning the firm value, equity, debt and credit spread.  
 
2.1 Merton (1974)  
The Merton (1974) work, being the seminal paper of structural models, relies on a set of 
assumptions that constitute the basis for many other models. Most of them are embedded 
in the Black and Scholes option pricing theory. These assumptions can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
Assumption 1: Markets are frictionless. There are no transaction costs, taxes, bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs or problems with indivisibility of assets. 
Assumption 2: Every individual acts as if he can buy or sell as much of any security as he 
wishes without affecting the market price. 
Assumption 3: There is a riskless asset, whose rate of return per unit of time is known and 
constant over time, implying a flat and constant term structure of risk free rates. 
Assumption 4: Trading takes place continuously and individuals may take short positions 
in any security, including the riskless asset.  
Assumption 5: The dynamics for the value of the assets, Vt, can be described by a 
diffusion-type process with stochastic differential equation 
 ( ) tttt dZVdtVVd σδµ +−=          (2.1) 
 
where µ is the instantaneous expected rate of return on the assets, δ is the constant 
fraction of value paid to both equityholders and debtholders (payout ratio), σ the constant 
variance of the return on the underlying asset, and Zt a standard wiener process. Even 
though the original version of Merton (1974) model assumes no payout ratio, we 
incorporate this parameter in our model, as most firms pay both interest to bondholders 
and dividends to equityholders.  
Assumption 6: The asset value is financed both by equity, E, and one representative zero-
coupon noncallable debt contract, D, with maturity T and face value F. Moreover, there 
are no issues of any type of security during the life of the debt contract. 
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Assumption 7: The absolute priority rule holds. At maturity, equityholders only obtain a 
positive payoff after debtholders being totally reimbursed.  
Assumption 8: Even though the assets of the firm secure the debt, the debtholders cannot 
force the firm on bankruptcy until T. 
 
From assumption 1 and 6 it follows that the value of the firm and the asset value are 
identical and do not depend on the capital structure itself. The asset value, V0, is thus 
given by the sum of risky debt and equity. 
 
EDV +=0             (2.2) 
 
At maturity, in the case that the face value payment is not met, the bondholders 
receive the entire value of the firm (implying a recovery rate of 100%) and equityholders 
nothing. If the asset value is higher than the face value then, the equityholders, as 
residual claimers, receive the difference between these two values. This means that, at 
maturity, equity and debt are given, respectively, by: 
 [ ]FVE TT −= ,0max         (2.3) 
   [ ]FVD TT ,min=         (2.4) 
 
With this framework, equity can be seen as a call option on the value of the firm with 
strike price F. On the other hand, debtholders have bought a risk free bond with face 
value F and given the equityholders the option to sell them the firm’s assets for F. Equity 
value is therefore given by Black and Scholes (1973) formula 
 ( ) ( )21000 ),,,,,( dNFedNeVFrTVE rTT −− −= δδσ      (2.5) 
 
with 
T
Tr
F
V
d σ
σδ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
= 2
ln
2
0
1  
Tdd σ−= 12  
 
where ( )oN  is the cumulative standard normal distribution.  
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As regards the debt value it is given by 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )210
102
    
    
dNFedNeV
dNeVdNFeFe
PutEuropeanFeD
rTT
TrtrT
rT
−−
−−−
−
+−=
−−−−=
−=
δ
δ          (2.6) 
 
or alternatively: 
EVD −= 0          (2.7) 
 
where d1,d2 and N(d1) are defined above. 
 
One of the most important variables that is analysed in this study is the credit spread, 
CS. It is defined as the difference between the yield to maturity, ytm, and the risk free 
rate r. The yield to maturity is the rate that makes equal the market value of debt to the 
present value of the face value of debt. It is computed as 
 
T
F
D
ytm
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=
ln
       (2.8) 
 
Hence, the credit spread formula is 
 
( ) ( )
     
ln1 1
0
2 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−=−= − dNFe
V
dN
T
rytmCS rT        (2.9) 
 
where it can be seen that the credit spread is a direct function of the quasi-debt ratio 
0/VFe
rT− , maturity and asset volatility. Intimately related to credit spread is the Risk 
Neutral Default Probability (RNDP), which is, in this case, represented by N(-d2). 
 
 
2.2 Leland (1994)  
Leland (1994) introduces significant changes in relation to Merton’s (1994) work. It 
assumes the possibility of early default and considers perpetual debt instead of a zero 
coupon debt. Moreover, Leland (1994) introduces taxes and bankruptcy costs into the 
debt pricing model, leading to the existence of an optimal capital structure.  
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Despite these new assumptions, the firm value follows (2.1) and the risk free rate is 
constant2. Leland (1994) models a tax environment in which continuous coupon 
payments, C, are tax deductible. Considering a constant corporate tax rate τ , the firm 
obtains tax shields from its debt at a rate C τ  until default. Bankruptcy occurs when the 
firm value reaches a threshold Vb. In this case, the firm incurs costs αVb, where α is 
defined as the bankruptcy cost parameter or one minus the recovery rate. Because of 
these new “real world features” the levered firm value, v, is no longer identical to the 
unlevered firm value Vu. Rather, the firm value increases in the amount of tax shield, TS, 
and decreases in the amount of bankruptcy cost, BC.  
 
Under these new assumptions, the debt value is now 
 
( ) ( ) bbb VPPr
CD α−+−= 11      (2.10) 
 
where Vb is given by equation (2.11) and Pb is 
λ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
b
u
V
V .  
  
       ( ) λ
λτ
−
−−=
1
1
r
CVb      (2.11) 
 
The parameter λ in the bankruptcy trigger solution is 
 
( ) ( )
2
2
22
2
2
1
2
1
σσ
δ
σ
δ rrr +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−−  
 
Pb can be interpreted as the risk neutral default probability in Leland’s model and λ as the 
elasticity of the probability of default with respect to the value of the assets of the firm. 
As such, it is negative and increases with the volatility of the assets of the firm.  
 
The bankruptcy costs are given by 
 
bb VPBC α=       (2.12) 
 
                                                 
2 Once again we consider the version of Leland (1994) with payout ratio. 
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and the tax shield by 
λττ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
b
u
V
V
r
C
r
CTS      (2.13) 
 
The total firm value is defined as 
 
BCTSVDEv u −+=+=      (2.14) 
 
leading to an equity value 
DvE −=       (2.15) 
 
Likewise, the credit spread is  
r
D
CCS −=       (2.16) 
 
 
3.3 Fan and Sundaresan (2000) 
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) debt-equity swap assumes that at an endogenously 
determined lower reorganization boundary debtholders are offered a proportion of the 
firm’s equity to replace the original debt contract. This can be thought as a distress 
exchange. At a certain trigger point Vb the claimants negotiate not to operate the firm and 
sell their stake to outsiders who pay them the value of the assets of the firm. It resembles 
a swap because debtholders swap their debt for equity and then sell the equity to potential 
buyers. As the model assumes corporate taxes, there is the expectation that equity is 
priced properly to reflect the tax benefit of a future recapitalization. This tax advantage 
should offset the cost of a future renegotiation with outsiders.  
 
Unlike Leland (1994), which does not include the possibility of debt renegotiation, 
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) assume a  continuous bargaining power parameter η. When  
η = 1 equityholders have all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it offers to 
debtholders. On the other hand, when η = 0, we get Leland (1994) outcome where 
debtholders make take-it-or-leave-it offers to equityholders.   
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With this refinement in Leland’s (1994) model the valuation framework turns as 
follows. The debt value is now defined as 
 
( ) ( ) bbb VPPr
CD ηα−+−= 11      (2.17) 
 
where the new bankruptcy threshold is 
 ( )
ηαλ
λτ
−−
−−=
1
1
1
1
r
CVb       (2.18) 
 
and Pb and λ are defined as before. 
 
Equity and firm value are given by equations (2.19) and (2.20), respectively. 
 ( ) ( ) bbbbbu PVPVPr
CVE −+−−−= ηατ 11     (2.19) 
DEv +=       (2.20) 
 
As Fan and Sundaresan (2000) also assumes a continuous perpetual coupon, the 
credit spread is given by equation (2.16). 
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3. Conclusion 
This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on structural models of 
corporate debt pricing. During the last years we saw many theoretical developments in 
the field of credit risk research. Most of this research concentrated on the pricing of 
corporate and sovereign defaultable bonds as the basis of credit risk pricing. These 
studies can be divided in two main categories: structural models and reduced-form 
models. 
 
Structural models have its origins in Merton (1974) framework, which has been the 
key foundation of corporate debt pricing. As noticed by Cossin and Pirrote (2001), “It is 
called the ‘structural approach’ because it relies entirely upon the sharing rule for the 
value of the assets of the firm between two main classes of claimholders, the 
shareholders and the bondholders, in other words, it depends on the actual capital 
structure of the firm”(p.15). In such a framework, the default process of a company is 
driven by the value of the company’s assets and the firm’s default risk is explicitly linked 
to the variability in the firm’s asset value. Under these structural models, all the relevant 
credit risk elements, including default, are a function of the structural characteristics of 
the firm: asset volatility (business risk) and leverage (financial risk).  
 
Reduced-form models, on the other hand, do not condition default on the value of the 
firm, and parameters related to the firm’s value do not need to be estimated. Moreover, 
reduced-form models introduce explicit assumptions regarding the dynamics of default 
variables. These variables are modeled independently from the structural features of the 
firm, its asset volatility and leverage.  
 
It provides an understanding of the importance of structural models in predicting credit 
spreads, and focuses on the role of rating, maturity, asset volatility and sector effects.  
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